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Roots
Northern Ireland is possibly one of the longest running territorial disputes 
in the Western world. Modern politics has been defined for generations by 
the struggle between those seeking a united all-Ireland republic, independent 
from and distinct to Great Britain, and those seeking to defend and deepen 
the British ‘Union.’ This drew on deep historic roots in imperialism in Ireland, 
in which a militantly Protestant British Empire expanded its reach over an 
island where the majority population was and remained stubbornly loyal to 
Roman Catholicism. The association of religion, politics, and economics with 
imperialism and resistance combined to embed a deep sense of suspicion, 
antagonism, and hostility, which was especially difficult to resolve where 
people living on both sides of the hostility lived in close proximity and made 
simultaneous claims to legitimate power. Critically, it bred a political rationale 
for violence, which came to mark Ireland out from the rest of the British Isles. 
Whereas by 1920, the rise of democracy as the source of legitimacy created 
decisive majorities for Irish nationalism in much of Ireland, but it merely 
deepened the sense of division and resentment in the North.
Ireland’s position on the western periphery of Europe and the absence of 
significant mineral resources acted to limit the extent to which Irish terri-
tory could be entangled with wider international relations. While Catholic 
advocates and Irish nationalists persistently sought support from France and 
Spain, the sheer logistics of establishing a successful military bridgehead 
against British interests in Ireland largely prevented serious effort. Irish history 
is instead characterised by episodes of local uprising, deep intercommunal 
antagonism, and sporadic attempts to engage French or Spanish military 
interest. 
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At the same time, Ireland was, in historical terms, an early participant in 
the expansion of parliamentary democracy, especially after discriminatory 
restrictions on Catholic participation in political life were abolished in 1829. 
Thereafter, until 1920, Ireland participated in the expansion of the franchise 
at the same pace as those in the rest of the United Kingdom. As elsewhere, 
the ethical thrust of liberal democracy was on the political equality of indi-
vidual citizenship. Daniel O’Connell, the first great Irish democratic leader, 
took a leading role in the Chartist movement, which rallied huge crowds in 
favour of the universal franchise throughout Victorian Britain. During the 
nineteenth century, the emphasis was on establishing the principle of equal 
citizenship against the traditional privileges of inheritance. By the turn of the 
century, attention had turned to the inclusion of women in the electorate, a 
principle finally conceded in 1918.
The Ethics of Ethnicity
The political and ethical framework within which modern Ireland emerged 
therefore rested on two fundamental pillars: the principle of democratic 
participation in general, and the assertion of the right of Irish people to 
self-determine their destiny as a distinct and defined nation and territory, 
free from external domination. Self-determination was directly connected to 
specifically ethical claims for freedom and justice, and it was both personal 
and national. By implication, Irish nationalists understood their project as an 
ethical, as well as a power-political, enterprise. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, discomfort with the implication that imperialism was incompatible 
with the principle of human equality convinced the Liberal Prime Minister 
of the United Kingdom to champion the cause of Irish Home Rule, an issue 
that was to bitterly divide British politics for thirty years.
But whereas in much of Ireland democracy resulted in large majorities for 
Irish parliamentary nationalism, imperialism in the richest and most industrial 
part of Ireland—the North—left a very different settlement pattern and a very 
different democratic legacy. Local protestant majorities, extending across all 
classes, organised to resist what they saw as the extension of Roman Catholic 
authoritarianism and the potential for revenge against Protestant domina-
tion, which an Irish national framework would create. In 1912, hundreds 
of thousands signed a petition with profoundly religious overtones, known 
as the Ulster Covenant, which rejected Home Rule as “disastrous to the 
material well-being of Ulster as well as of the whole of Ireland, subversive of 
our civil and religious freedom, destructive of our citizenship, and perilous 
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to the unity of the Empire,” and asserted their willingness to use “all means 
which may be found necessary” to resist its application.1 
Both sides to the dispute over Home Rule now defined their cause in moral 
terms. Central ethical principles—like freedom, justice, and democracy—were 
deployed by all parties to appeal to external allies. Unionists spoke directly 
to principles of loyalty to comrades and to the British conservative conceit 
that British imperialism was, in practice, the primary vehicle for international 
liberty, through the spread of free trade and democracy. This sentiment is 
most clearly reflected by Rudyard Kipling in his bitter anti-Home Rule 
poem, “Ulster 1912”:
Rebellion, rapine hate
Oppression, wrong and greed
Are loosed to rule our fate,
By England’s act and deed.
The Faith in which we stand,
The laws we made and guard,
Our honour, lives, and land
Are given for reward
To Murder done by night,
To Treason taught by day,
To folly, sloth, and spite,
And we are thrust away. (Kipling 1919, 9–11)
Irish nationalism found its most enthusiastic support among the radical 
diaspora in North America, who nurtured bitter memories of starvation, 
forced emigration, and landlessness in rural Ireland. Already in 1867, Fenian 
supporters in the US framed the rebellion in moral terms:
We appeal to force as a last resort ... unable to endure any longer the 
curse of a monarchical government, we aim at founding a Republic 
based on universal suffrage, which shall secure to all the intrinsic 
value of their labour. The soil of Ireland, at present in possession of 
an oligarchy, belongs to us, the Irish people and to us it must be 
restored. (Lee 2008, 56)
Both Unionists and Nationalists therefore pursued projects which they 
understood not merely as ‘ethical’ in a general sense, but as moral imperatives 
whose realisation necessitated the use of violence. Both understood them-
1.  Available at http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/ulster_covenant.htm.
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selves as victims in an ontological and not merely circumstantial sense: the 
morality of specific actions was to be measured against the scale of historic 
injustice—either in the past, in the form of political oppression or in the 
future in the threat of imminent catastrophe—which was the alternative. 
In a powerful echo of Dostoevsky’s dictum that: “The more I love human-
ity in general, the less I love man in particular” (Dostoevsky 2004, 60), the 
sacrifice of lives was a regrettable element in the liberation of life. The most 
incorruptible, and by implication the most noble, like Robespierre, were the 
most ruthless. Under pressure from violence and threats, violence became 
imperative rather than detestable, and the notion of the universal human 
subject was submerged under the clear distinction between friend and foe.
Antagonism and Its Consequences
As Frank Wright commented, the definition of antagonism is a relationship 
in which the other is perceived as part of a conspiracy, and against which 
eternal vigilance is required (Wright 1987, 122). People caught up in an 
antagonistic relationship cannot dismiss the possibility that the other is part 
of a hostile conspiracy. Anxiety is lessened, but not eliminated, by the calm-
ing rhetoric of moderates and personal relationships if the other is perceived 
to belong to a hostile group. But by treating the conspiracy as real, we are 
driven to conspire ourselves.
Once antagonism to another becomes embedded as a political imperative, 
its most profound consequence is to invert the ethical logic which sees all 
human beings as worthy of fundamental respect and replace it with a struggle 
in which the freedom of one depends on the destruction of the other. The 
language of ethnic cleansing which emerged in the Balkans in the 1990s 
reflects a view that the destruction and expulsion of the other is an act of 
purification. 
The result is a pervasive but fundamental distinction between friend and 
foe, a distinction which is treated as ‘fact’ and ‘common sense.’ Antagonism 
creates a self-replicating engine of vigilance in which each act of violence 
promises to end violence, but actually generates more violence, in a pattern 
of reciprocity and escalation. What persists is the structure of ‘them and us,’ 
where responsibility lies with ‘the other,’ and can only be solved by ‘them’ or 
by victory over them. Antagonism hides the mechanism through which we 
are also contributory within the reciprocal cycle, raising resisting the enemy to 
heroism and declaring compromise as appeasement. The heart of antagonistic 
conflict is this self-perpetuating dynamic of conspiracy, discrimination, and 
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terror in which everyone participates and nobody feels responsible, and in 
which violence and ethics align in a kind of logical death spiral.
This in itself has further ethical consequences. In a conspiratorial world, 
it is simply irrational to promote equality. Antagonism turns everything into 
a conflict to get and hold the maximum amount of resources before rivals 
can claim them. If inequality creates conflict, it is equally true that conflict 
rationalises inequality. 
The coming into existence of Northern Ireland in 1920 had the effect of 
embedding intergroup hostility at the core of political life. Furthermore, it 
implicated democratic procedure in this by promoting leaders who reflected 
the antagonistic relationship and offered to act to protect the group against 
its enemies, rather than to transcend the relationship. Unsurprisingly, the 
higher ethical claims of democracy—including the core principle that every 
person counts, in relation both to fundamental individual rights and to the 
principle of equal political value—were qualified in this prism. For as long 
as the existence of Northern Ireland itself remained contested, voting in 
elections was essentially reduced to a head-counting exercise on that appar-
ently existential question.
Paradoxically, the fact that neither Britain nor Ireland had any immediate 
interest in resolving this dilemma allowed it to remain in a state of unstable 
equilibrium for fifty years. Unionist Prime Ministers in Northern Ireland 
were first and foremost leaders of their Protestant tribe against Nationalist 
ambition, rather than uniting symbols of shared citizenship. Within the formal 
apparatus of a democracy, informal political culture reflected the fundamental 
antagonism between groups of citizens. Without a formal trace, the friend 
and foe dynamic was embedded in the routine of the state. 
This in its turn provides and provided a new breeding group for polarisa-
tion and resentment. Once systematic inequality is rationalised as necessary 
for self-defence, the antagonistic pattern of citizenship becomes embedded 
in discrimination and resentment, institutionalising a de facto experience 
of first- and second-class citizenship based on group divisions. Inevitably, 
Unionists explained the root of this crisis by the malevolent intentions of 
Nationalism, whereas Nationalists condemned the system of larger and smaller 
exclusions institutionalised in the fabric of the state. 
The erosion of universal ethics under ethnic antagonism is profound. 
Freedom can no longer be treated as a universal human ethical principle, 
but is a finite good dependent on political or military triumph over specific 
others. By equating victory with justice, violence is raised to the highest 
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ethic. In the face of existential threat, war is necessarily just. The only justice 
is victory. By equating peace with treachery, cooperation is anathema. 
Internal participants present a narrative of provocation (by others) and 
reaction (by us) in which differences in moral responsibility are absolute. 
Outside observers without stake in the antagonistic relationship see a pattern 
of reciprocity and similarity, where heroes and villains perform essentially the 
same acts observed from different sides of an antagonistic relationship. The 
gap between justice and revenge reduces to an almost indistinguishable level. 
Unsurprisingly, it is this insight of the equivalence of heroism and crime and 
the ambivalence of our categories of victim and perpetrator which provoke 
the greatest resistance of all (Girard 1987).
Identity is defined against the other and it becomes almost impossible 
to distinguish the extent to which identity is in the solidarity of being 
‘anti-them’ or in being ‘pro-us.’ Peace will thus not only demand a change 
in relationship with the other, it will radically alter our understanding of 
self. Politicians discover that any compromise or refusal to represent the fear 
underlying antagonism will lead to their replacement by more radical ele-
ments. Unless some mechanism is found to break this, politics is reduced to 
a Clausewitzian extension of war, with the inherent potential to ‘escalate to 
the extremes’ (von Clausewitz 1984, 77). 
The Exhaustion of War
Northern Ireland is unusual in international relations, in that it did not 
draw in the surrounding states to the logic of its internal antagonism. Instead, 
the violence of divisions in Ireland acted to repel outsiders. After 1920, both 
Britain and Ireland sought to protect themselves against the potentially 
destabilising impact of its hostilities rather than be drawn into them. On 
the other hand, not only were they unable or unprepared to act to resolve 
the antagonism, they increasingly lost any sense of direct responsibility for 
it; Northern Ireland was to be managed. Even once violence broke out in 
earnest between 1969 and 1972, the primary political goal of the British 
government was to restore the ‘acceptable level of violence.’
The consequences of this were unusual. On the one hand, as part of a 
Western European welfare state, Northern Ireland continued to draw on 
considerable financial and economic subsidy, in spite of the collapse of any 
substantial private economy. This combination of active security policy, conflict 
management, and economic support simultaneously created a curious and 
unusual hybrid of ethnic and nationalist polarisation, alongside a function-
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ing administration and civic society. Most of the violence took place either 
between paramilitary organisations or between paramilitary organisations 
and the state. There was no interstate war, but the antagonism between 
the Nationalist population and the British state was exacerbated at times 
through the often-violent interface between the British army and the local 
population. Intergroup violence on a wider scale was prevented through 
public engineering, such as the erection of permanent security barriers 
between exclusively Catholic and Protestant neighbourhoods (interfaces) 
and the subsidy of parallel systems of community development. Meanwhile, 
the civil service was expanded to create new jobs and the hardest edges of 
discrimination were removed.
Eventually, a new unstable equilibrium emerged, in which violence was 
endemic but increasingly strategically counterproductive. When, almost by 
accident and against her instincts, Margaret Thatcher was persuaded to sign 
a new strategic alliance with the Irish republic in 1985 (the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement), the unexpected result was the reemergence of a new universal 
ethic for peace-building in Northern Ireland which refused the ‘ethnic’ 
implications of Northern Irish antagonism and promoted instead a new 
doctrine of universal and inclusive ‘reconciliation.’ 
While some of this was already visible to the leaders of moderate national-
ism, such as John Hume and (particularly) Garret Fitzgerald, and the more 
conciliatory parts of the British Conservative party (Sir Geoffrey Howe) who 
were its architects, the emergence of a settlement rooted in universal ethical 
framework can more plausibly be traced to a combination of near-despair at 
the failure to contain the endless spiral of violence and a vaguely articulated 
sense that the ethics which had shaped Western European politics since 
Auschwitz were at stake. In a general sense, this was welfare state leadership: 
a combination of pragmatism and principles, interests and instincts and of 
committees and diplomacy, rather than grand gesture. Reconciliation was 
understood in principle rather than in practice. Nonetheless, and in a real 
sense it changed the game in Northern Ireland, from one of ethnic one-
upmanship to a search for a universal framework.
The Ethical and the Ethnic in Transition
The power of the Northern Ireland peace process rested on an ethical 
framework rooted in universalist values which were both consciously taken 
for granted and often only intermittently observed in Western capitals. While 
ethical inconsistency and hypocrisy were hardly new in international affairs, 
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it became clear, however, that if the argument for an inclusive peace was 
stronger, the more it could be championed as an ethical alternative to violence 
and ethnic separatism. Reconciliation proved to be a powerfully attractive 
proposition for all those who were repelled by the violence of Northern 
Ireland, rather than drawn to it.
Thus although the Anglo-Irish reconciliation project initially set the gov-
ernments of the UK and Ireland and their international allies in the US and 
Europe at extreme odds with their ethnic clients in Northern Ireland—and 
Unionists mobilised in hundreds of thousands to reject any involvement of 
the Republic of Ireland in internal Northern Irish affairs, while Republicans 
vocally rejected the new initiative—it had the effect of limiting this rejec-
tion largely to Northern Ireland and to militant partisans outside. Elsewhere, 
the ethical appeal of an inclusive peace was utterly persuasive, especially as 
direct material interests in Northern Ireland were so limited. As a result, the 
ethnic antagonists of Northern Ireland now faced the utter indifference of 
the international community to their causes and an ethical rejection of both 
their methods and their arguments. In strategic terms, the opportunity costs 
of violence increased exponentially. Gradually, and against their initial will, 
all parties were drawn into the negotiating framework which it created.
What is remarkable is the extent to which the process was articulated by 
the system rather than by individuals. The custodians of the process were 
the governments of Britain and Ireland, supported by US diplomacy and 
finance, and even more finance from the European Union. They were of 
course also interested parties, at least to the extent that they had profound 
historic allegiances and political, security, and civic responsibilities. But they 
shared a common view that the crisis in Northern Ireland had to be brought 
to an end for both in the national and ethical interest. For a combination of 
domestic and international reasons, the US leadership, especially under the 
Clinton Presidency, gave Northern Ireland a prominence which its size and 
importance did not deserve, while Jacques Delors saw in Northern Ireland 
an opportunity to realise both the historic peace-mission of the European 
Union and an opportunity for direct intervention. 
This combination of political, security, and financial muscle was then 
deployed through diplomacy, legislation, and an unusual and noteworthy 
strategy of social and economic intervention. Reconciliation was promoted 
through targeted interventions in the labor market (equality), through support 
for integrated education, through economic and community regeneration, and 
through support for dialogue and mediation at the local level (community 
8
The International Journal of Ethical Leadership, Vol. 2 [2013], Art. 16
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol2/iss1/16
165Morrow  Self and Other in Northern Ireland
relations). Intercommunity peace initiatives, whether by heroic individuals 
,such as Gordon Wilson, or longstanding champions of reconciliation, such as 
the Corrymeela Community, were given both publicity and encouragement. 
Although the initial steps in all of these areas were tentative, relying often 
on experimentation and coalitions of willing volunteers and pioneers, over 
twenty-five years they became embedded aspects in the landscape of social and 
economic development in Northern Ireland. Leadership was distributed across 
civic society and through legislative interventions to promote independent 
institutions guided by principles of equality and, after 1998, of human rights.
The holy grail, and most difficult challenge lay with change in politics. 
Without local political leadership and partnership, the project continued 
to rely on external supporters. Furthermore, while the governments were 
convinced of the centrality of an ethical peace process, their primary interest 
was to divest themselves of direct entanglement in Northern Ireland. In the 
absence of the emergence of a new leadership, the implicit narrative of the 
peace process was therefore one of creating the conditions under which the 
old leadership would find room to change. In this, all parties shared a dilemma: 
local political leadership continued to reflect the underlying antagonism and 
suspicion of Northern Irish voters, yet at the same time were now expected 
to explore opportunities for ending violence and establishing a better future. 
Furthermore, it was abundantly clear that further violence was tactically 
useless and increasingly nihilistic. The story of the Northern Ireland peace 
process is a story of the engagement of these hostile parties within a common 
framework while attempting to find linguistic and political formulations 
which allowed politicians to make significant changes without appearing to 
betray established causes and positions. 
The result was a contorted, complex, and difficult process of accommoda-
tions, compromises, and trade-offs which came together as the Belfast or Good 
Friday Agreement in 1998.2 Problematically, even this gigantic achievement was 
insufficient to completely eliminate the suspicions underpinning antagonism. 
Within four years, the political institutions and the intercommunity coalition 
underpinning the agreement collapsed and the governments were faced with 
further endless decades of external administration or further compromises 
with Northern Ireland antagonists to devolve responsibility and power. In the 
event, after five years of living with the former, they succeeded in renegotiat-
ing elements of the 1998 agreement to the satisfaction of the outer wings of 
2.  Belfast Agreement, April 10, 1998. Available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs 
/agreement.htm.
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Unionism and Republicanism. In 2007, an exhausted intergovernmental and 
international coalition closed the book on Northern Ireland and declared 
peace achieved, guaranteed by previously unthinkable images of enemies sitting 
together as joint patrons of the new intercommunity system of government.
Afterword
The Missing Link: Ethical Leadership for an Ethical Society
The Northern Ireland peace process is an almost paradigm case of sys-
temic action for peace in the Western world. Reconciliation emerged as 
clear ethical alternative to ethnic and national conflagration after 1985 and 
it engaged the political systems of two western states and their allies for two 
decades in an almost unique effort to transform a deeply polarised society. 
In doing so, it deployed all of the weapons of western democracy: the cajol-
ing leadership of political figures such as Garret Fitzgerald and John Hume, 
John Major and Albert Reynolds, Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern; the military 
logic of containment; the economics of incentives for peace, diplomatic, and 
international attention; platform and flattery in Washington, Brussels, and the 
Nobel Committee in Oslo; and the heroic efforts of small scale community-
led initiatives to promote a shared future against the odds of ethnic hatred 
at community, religious, and educational levels. This coalition introduced 
frameworks for equality and human rights, established a consensus against the 
use of violence, and was flexible and open in its treatment of prisoners and 
former combatants. Within their own movements, prisoners, combatants, and 
victims often themselves became important persuaders for the new process. 
All of this activity created a space for political leadership to shape and 
to own, a process which was completed in 2007. Problematically, however, 
no visible political leader emerged in Northern Ireland for whom the new 
reconciliation was in itself a vision to champion. Instead, all parties continued 
to see the agreement process not as a miraculous escape from antagonism, 
but as a necessary, if difficult, compromise with the unpalatable. Instead of an 
agreement which replaced the unethical with the possibility of ethics, political 
leadership was unable to eliminate the suspicion that the agreement and the 
peace process were an unethical compromise with an evil enemy. As a con-
sequence, neither part was willing to institute any process of reviewing their 
past relationship which might highlight the unethical nature of the violence 
deployed to prosecute their cause. As time went on, it became increasingly 
clear that this unwillingness to risk ethical equality in relation to violence in 
the past was preventing any progress towards real trust in the future.
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Northern Ireland therefore still stands at its crossroads, evidence that peace 
is a decision in human affairs, requiring people who make decisions, at least 
as much as a process or a mechanism or an event. Northern Ireland does 
not lack for a sophisticated political, administrative, and legislative model for 
peace. But it lacks a champion, a vision, and a model of a shared vision of the 
future, still paralysed and lacking someone or some mechanism to plausibly 
move towards a different future. Pending leadership, peace will remain fragile 
and tantalising.
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